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Abstract—Many security protocols involve humans, not ma-
chines, as endpoints. The differences are critical: humans are
not only computationally weaker than machines, they are naive,
careless, and gullible. In this paper, we provide a model for
formalizing and reasoning about these inherent human limita-
tions and their consequences. Specifically, we formalize models of
fallible humans in security protocols as multiset rewrite theories.
We show how the Tamarin tool can then be used to automatically
analyze security protocols involving human errors. We provide
case studies of authentication protocols that show how different
protocol constructions and features differ in their effectiveness
with respect to different kinds of fallible humans. This provides a
starting point for a fine-grained classification of security protocols
from a usable-security perspective.
I. INTRODUCTION
Humans use and interact with security protocols in many
contexts, for example during e-banking or to cast their vote
in electronic elections. In contrast to protocols where only
machines communicate with each other and precisely follow
the protocol specification, new opportunities for attacks arise
when humans are involved. It is possible that users do not
understand what they should and should not do and even
knowledgeable users may neglect to perform some protocol
steps due to carelessness.
Attackers, of course, are well aware of human fallibility
and exploit this in their attacks. Humans are often targeted
because it is easier to get information or access to a system by
social engineering rather than by directly attacking machines
or breaking the underlying cryptography. For example, many
people are fooled by phishing attacks into simply giving
away their secret credentials. Moreover, humans are bad at
identifying phishing websites even when they are specifically
instructed to do so in controlled lab environments [4], [12].
Hence even when security is their primary concern and they
are attentive, humans are incapable of performing basic secu-
rity checks. This problem is exacerbated in everyday situations
where security is a secondary concern. Despite the severity of
this problem, human weaknesses have received little attention
in security protocol analysis. Since there are situations where
human interaction in protocols is unavoidable [10], we must
be able to analyze this interaction.
In this work, we propose a formal model of communication
protocols that includes humans and their fallibilities. We
define a human error as any deviation of a human from the
protocol specification. We identify two natural approaches to
defining fallible humans that may deviate from the protocol
specification to different extents. We then single out one of
these approaches where we consider fallible humans that can
take arbitrary steps instead of following a specification. This
models non-expert humans in everyday protocols.
To support automated reasoning, we build on an exist-
ing formalization of security protocols as multiset rewriting
theories and extend it with fallible, non-expert humans. The
resulting formalism is supported by the automatic verification
tool Tamarin [20], [25] and enables the unbounded verification
of security protocols.
We validate our formal model in two case studies. First, we
examine an authentication protocol and a proposed improved
version thereof. Second, we analyze different phone-based
authentication protocols and compare their security guarantees
with respect to different kinds of fallible humans. All these
protocols have the goal of authenticating a human agent to a
remote server and all of them succeed with infallible humans.
However Tamarin finds numerous and varied attacks on these
protocols arising from different kinds of human errors.
Contributions: We present the first formal model of human
errors in security protocols. This model makes precise the no-
tion that humans are fallible and may not behave as expected.
It thereby bridges the gap between formal models of security
protocols that fail to consider human errors and the empirical
analyses of protocols that demonstrate how these errors can
lead to attacks.
We identify different approaches to defining fallible humans
and show how one of them can be formalized and integrated
into an existing formalization of security protocols. The re-
sulting model is supported by Tamarin and allows for the
unbounded verification of security protocols involving fallible
humans. In addition to a distinguished human H for whom
security properties are analyzed, we allow for an arbitrary
number of fallible humans in the network. This allows errors
made by other humans to affect the security guarantees that
hold for H .
We present two applications of our model to automatically
finding attacks arising from human errors. First, we analyze
an authentication protocol in detail and compare it with a
modified version that uses a heuristic to avoid human errors.
Second, we compare existing phone-based authentication pro-
tocols that use different methods to authenticate a human to a
remote server. We examine different authentication properties
and consider humans with different skills. The model helps us
identify which methods provide effective protection against
which kinds of fallible humans.
Our applications show that our model provides a formal
basis to understand different security practices and their ef-
fects. For instance we identify what information is useful to a
human to achieve a given protocol’s security goals. Moreover,
the model allows us to make fine-grained distinctions between
protocols with respect to their resilience to different kinds of
human errors. This adds a new dimension to the framework
proposed by Bonneau et al. [8], where all but one of the
protocols have previously been compared.
Organization: We present in Section II different approaches
to defining fallible humans. We give an overview of an
existing formal protocol model in Section III and enhance
it in Section IV to account for fallible humans. Afterward,
we present two applications of our model. In Section V, we
analyze one protocol in detail and in Section VI we compare
different protocols for authenticating a human to a server. We
discuss related work in Section VII and draw conclusions in
Section VIII.
II. APPROACHES TO DEFINING FALLIBLE HUMANS
We start with a simple model of human capabilities. We
assume that humans can perform simple computations but
not complex operations. That is, they are able to send and
receive messages on specified channels, concatenate (i.e., pair)
messages, and split concatenated messages. In our model,
humans cannot, unaided, encrypt or decrypt messages; they
require computers for this.
A protocol defines the behaviors of agents (computers or
humans) by specifying their role. We model human agents by
keeping track of their knowledge and allowing other agents
and the adversary to query and update the human’s knowledge.
This models that a human can store information from any
source and communicate his knowledge to others. We do not
limit the number of terms that humans can remember. We
define human error considering only a human’s behavior, but
neither his intention nor the reasons that lead to his errors.
Definition 1. A human error in a protocol execution is any
deviation of a human from his or her role specification. Such
a human is said to be fallible. A human that does not deviate
from his role specification is said to be infallible.
A fallible human gives rise to more system behaviors than
an infallible human because, in addition to following the
protocol specification, the fallible human can deviate from it.
Human agents can therefore be partially ordered by the sets
of system behaviors they allow. This leads us to propose two
natural approaches to analyzing the security of protocols in the
presence of human errors: The skilled human approach, where
we consider increasingly fallible humans by adding possibili-
ties for human error and the rule-based human approach where
we remove possibilities for human error.
The two approaches are inspired by the human performance
levels that psychologists differentiate between in the GEMS
model [23]. At the skill-based level, a human behaves accord-
ing to familiar detailed patterns that have led her to the desired
or a similar goal before, but she can err. At the rule-based








(a) I = Infallible Human
U
(b) U = Untrained Human
Fig. 1: Skilled and Rule-Based Human Approaches:
Black and gray nodes represent skilled and rule-based humans,
respectively. An arrow denotes that the human at the tail node
induces only a subset of the system behaviors that the human
at the arrow’s tip induces.
of the form “in situation X perform action Y ”. In contrast to
psychological models, we assume that a rule-based human will
never apply a rule incorrectly; he will always follow exactly
the rules he knows. We discuss the two approaches next.
However, we focus in this work on the rule-based approach.
A. Skilled Humans
The skilled human approach starts from an infallible human
agent, depicted by the node I at the top of the hierarchy in
Figure 1a. In this approach, human errors are modeled by
weakening the infallible human agent to a skilled human agent
who can make a fixed number of mistakes. Thus while the
infallible human agent represents an expert human who never
errs, the skilled human agent represents a human that knows
the protocol’s steps, but can make a slip.
An example of a skilled human is an expert user that knows
what she must do, but skips a verification step of the protocol
due to inattentiveness. In Figure 1a, each black node in the
hierarchy represents a skilled human agent. Depending on the
specified mistakes that the human can make, more or fewer
system behaviors are possible. This approach allows us to
examine which specific errors lead to attacks on protocols.
B. Rule-Based Humans
The rule-based human approach starts from an untrained
human agent depicted by node U at the bottom of the hier-
archy in Figure 1b. The untrained human does not know the
protocol specification and may blindly follow any adversarial
instruction he is given. That is, the untrained human agent
can perform any action permitted by the execution model.
In this approach, rule-based human agents are defined by
strengthening the untrained human agent with a set of rules
that he must follow. This models a human that does not know
the protocol specification but adheres to some basic guidelines.
An example of this is a human who knows he must only
type his password into a trusted device, even if he does not
know the detailed steps of the protocol he participates in. Rule-
based human agents are shown as gray nodes in Figure 1b.
While the untrained human can behave arbitrarily, the rules
of a rule-based human restrict his possible behaviors and
thus the system behaviors. We will fix a set of guidelines in
Section IV-C, when we formally define rule-based humans.
III. MODELING SECURITY PROTOCOLS
In this section, we summarize an existing security protocol
model that we extend, in the next section, to account for
fallible humans. The model presented here is based on the
Tamarin model [20], [25] with some minor extensions for
representing channels with security properties [5].
A. Preliminaries
The term algebra of messages is given by TΣ(X), where
Σ is a signature and X a disjoint, countably infinite set of
variables. The ground terms are TΣ. Fsym ⊂ Σ denotes a finite
set of function symbols that always contains the functions
pair(_, _), also denoted by 〈_, _〉, for pairing, pi1(_) and pi2(_)
for the first and second projection of a pair of terms, and h(_)
for hashing terms. Moreover, Fsym contains function symbols
for symmetric and asymmetric encryption as well as creating
and verifying digital signatures. For a message m and a key
k, the functions senc(m, k) and sdec(m, k) denote symmetric
encryption and decryption, aenc(m, k) and adec(m, k) denote
asymmetric encryption and decryption, and sign(m, k) and
verify(sign,m, k) are used for signing messages and verifying
signatures. The function pk(k) represents the public key
corresponding to the private key k. The standard equational
theory for these functions is given in [5, Appendix A].
Σ also contains the two countably infinite sets of fresh and
public constants, denoted by Cfresh and Cpub , respectively.
Fresh constants model the generation of nonces, whereas
public terms represent agent names and other publicly known
values. The sets Fsym , Cfresh and Cpub are pairwise disjoint.
We denote sequences with square brackets and use the oper-
ator · to concatenate sequences.
B. Protocol Specification
We use the extended Alice&Bob notation of [5] to specify
security protocols. A simple protocol specification, for a
fictitious protocol called SimpleProtocol, is shown in Figure 2.
The protocol specifies two roles named S and R. Initially S
knows R, while R knows S and the message m2, as indicated
with the keyword knows. In the first step, S generates a fresh
message m1, indicated with the keyword fresh, and sends it to
R over an insecure channel, denoted by ◦−→◦. Then R responds
with the message m2 over a secure channel, denoted by •−→•.
This channel notation is taken from Maurer and Schmid’s
channel calculus [19]. In addition to the two channels shown in
Figure 2, we shall use the expressions A •−→◦ B and A ◦−→• B
to denote authentic and confidential channels from A to B,
respectively. On an authentic channel, the adversary can read
the communicated message but cannot modify the message or
its sender. Conversely, the adversary cannot learn a message
sent on a confidential channel. However, he can change the
sender of a message sent on a confidential channel or send
arbitrary messages from his own knowledge on it. A secure
channel is a channel that is both authentic and confidential.
Role scripts are the projections of an extended Alice&Bob
protocol specification to individual roles. They correspond to
strands in the strand spaces model [27] and processes in the
0. S : knows(R)
0. R : knows(S,m2)
1. S ◦−→◦ R : fresh(m1).m1
2. R •−→• S : m2
Fig. 2: Protocol SimpleProtocol in Alice&Bob notation.
[Start(S,R),Fresh(S,m1),Send(S, ins, R,m1)
,Receive(S, sec, R,m2)]
Fig. 3: Role Script of role S for SimpleProtocol.
applied pi calculus [3]. Formally, a role script is a sequence
of events e ∈ TΣ∪RoleActions(X), where RoleActions =
{Send,Receive,Start,Fresh} and the top-level func-
tion symbol of e is in RoleActions . Send and receive events
are of the form Send(A, l, P,m) and Receive(A, l, P,m),
where A is the role executing the event, l ∈ LinkProp =
{ins, auth, conf , sec} indicates the type of channel over
which a message is sent, P ∈ Cpub is a role’s name, and
m ∈ TΣ(X) is a message. The channel types ins , auth ,
conf , and sec denote insecure, authentic, confidential, and
secure channels and correspond in the obvious manner to the
channel symbols in the Alice&Bob notation. In a send event,
the communication partner P is the intended recipient of the
message m. In a receive event, the communication partner
P is the apparent sender, as the adversary may have forged
the message, and m is the expected message pattern. The fresh
event Fresh(A,m) indicates that the role A generates a fresh
message m and the start event Start(A,m) indicates the
initial knowledge m of the role A. The start event is the first
event of a role script and occurs only once.
Figure 3 shows the role script of S for SimpleProtocol. The
first event of the role script is the Start(S,R) event, where
S is the name of the executing role and R is the role’s initial
knowledge. The second event Fresh(S,m1) denotes that S
generates the fresh value m1. The third and fourth events
denote that S sends m1 to R over an insecure channel and
receives m2 from R over a secure channel, respectively.
C. Execution Model
We use Tamarin’s execution model [20], [25], which is
defined by a multiset term-rewriting system. A system state
is a multiset of facts. There are two types of facts, linear facts
and persistent facts. Linear facts model exhaustible resources
and they can be added to and removed from the system state.
Persistent facts model inexhaustible resources and can only be
added to the system state. Persistent fact symbols are prefixed
with an exclamation mark. The initial system state is the empty
multiset. A trace tr is a finite sequence of multisets of actions
a and is generated by the application of labeled state transition
rules of the form prem a−→ conc. A state transition rule is
applicable when the current state contains facts matching the
premise prem . The rule’s application removes the matching
[ ]
Start(S,R)−−−−−−−→ [AgSt(S, 0, R)] (S0)
[AgSt(S, 0, R),Fr(m1)]
Fresh(S,m1)−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(S, 1, 〈R,m1〉)] (S1)
[AgSt(S, 1, 〈R,m1〉)] Send(S,ins,R,m1)−−−−−−−−−−−→
[AgSt(S, 2, 〈R,m1〉),Outins(〈S,R,m1〉)] (S2)
[AgSt(S, 2, 〈R,m1〉), Insec(〈R,S,m2〉)]
Receive(S,sec,R,m2)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [AgSt(S, 3, 〈R,m1,m2〉)] (S3)
Fig. 4: Agent rules for agent S of protocol SimpleProtocol.
linear facts from the state, adds instantiations of the facts in
the conclusion conc to the state, and records the instantiations
of actions in a in the trace. The set of all traces of a set of
rules R is denoted by TR(R).
We use the HISP model extension of Tamarin [5] to give a
semantics to Alice&Bob protocols. A complete protocol model
consists of the fresh rule, adversary rules, channel rules, and
agent rules. The fresh rule
[ ] −→ [Fr(x)] (F1)
produces the fact Fr(x) where x ∈ Cfresh . No two applications
of this rule pick the same element x ∈ Cfresh and this is the
only rule that can produce terms x ∈ Cfresh . We use Tamarin’s
standard Dolev-Yao adversary [13] rules and the HISP channel
rules to model the sending and receiving of messages over au-
thentic, confidential, and secure channels. Agent rules specify
the agents’ state transitions and communication.
Given a role script of a role A, the corresponding agent
rules are produced as follows. For every event e in the role
script, we obtain a transition rule prem a−→ conc. The label
of the rule contains the event, i.e., e ∈ a. The premise prem
contains an agent state fact AgSt(A, c, kn), which keeps track
of the state of agent A, the protocol step c the agent is in,
and the agent’s knowledge kn . The conclusion conc contains
the subsequent agent state fact AgSt(A, c′, kn ′). If e is a
send event Send(A, l, P,m), then the rule’s conc additionally
contains an outgoing message fact Outl(〈A,P,m〉). If e is a
receive event Receive(A, l, P,m), then prem contains an
incoming message fact Inl(〈P,A,m〉). If e is a fresh event
Fresh(A, x), then prem contains a fresh fact Fr(x). Finally,
if e is a start event Start(A, i), then it is translated to a setup
rule where conc contains the initial agent state AgSt(A, 0, i).
Example 1. Consider the role script of S in SimpleProtocol
shown in Figure 3. Recall that S first sends a fresh message
m1 over an insecure channel to R and then receives from R a
message m2 over a secure channel. The agent rules for the
agent S are shown in Figure 4. The Setup Rule (S0) can
be applied in every system state. Therefore, its premise is
empty. The conclusion of the setup rule contains the Agent
State 0 of S, with the initial knowledge R. The first premise
of the rule (S1) is that S is in Agent State 0 where R
is in its knowledge. The second premise Fr(m1) denotes a
fresh value m1. Fr facts are produced by Rule (F1). In the
conclusion, the knowledge in the agent state of S is updated
with the fresh message m1 and S proceeds to Agent State 1.
For the send event (S2), the rule’s premise consists of the
current agent state. The effect of S sending a message to
an insecure channel is that the fact Outins is now available
in the network, expressed by the corresponding fact in the
conclusion. The second fact in the conclusion expresses that
agent S proceeds to the next agent state and keeps the same
knowledge. Rule (S3) expresses that S receives the message
m2, from R, over a secure channel, which is denoted by the
fact Insec in the premise. In the conclusion, the knowledge in
the agent state of S is updated with the received message m2
and S proceeds to the next agent state.
D. Security Properties
We instrument protocol rules with additional actions in
order to reason about the protocol’s security properties. Fol-
lowing Lowe [17], we use the actions Running(A,B,m) and
Commit(A,B,m) to define authentication properties. The
actions are added to the rules corresponding to the protocol
steps of an agent A, where A believes a given property to hold
with respect to some partner B and message m.
We consider entity and message authentication [21]. Entity
authentication states that one agent can be sure that another
agent has the identity she claims and that she actually par-
ticipated in the protocol: Whenever an agent B commits
to a protocol execution with another agent A, then A was
participating in the protocol recently. To capture recentness, we
require that there is some event of A between the start event of
B and B’s claim. A formal definition of entity authentication
is given in Definition 2 of Appendix A.
One way to authenticate humans is to ask them for some-
thing they know, like a password. If the correct password
is received as a response, we conclude that the right person
participated in the protocol. Another way is to check some-
thing the human possesses [21] such as a device D that he
carries with him and to which he has exclusive access. If
an agent B has the guarantee that a human H’s device D
recently participated in the protocol, then we say that device
authentication of H to B holds. The assumption thereby
is that D is only accessible to the human H that is being
authenticated. See Definition 3 of Appendix A.
Message authentication holds when an agent B can be sure
that a message was sent by another agent A. In contrast to
entity authentication, we do not require the recentness of the
sending event. A protocol provides message authentication of
message m from an agent A to an agent B if whenever B
believes to receive message m from A, then A previously
sent m. See Definition 4 of Appendix A.
Finally, we define secrecy in standard manner: a message
m is secret if the adversary does not learn it. See Definition 7
of Appendix A for secrecy’s formal definition.
IV. FORMALLY MODELING FALLIBLE HUMANS
We now extend the above model to account for human er-
rors. We first introduce the untrained-human rules and describe
how infallible and untrained humans are modeled. Afterward,
we introduce predicates to model rule-based humans.
A. Untrained-Human Rules
We construct agent rules for human roles in the same
manner as for the other roles of a protocol shown in Sec-
tion III. However, we also model that a human can make
errors and deviate from the protocol specification. Therefore
we introduce the untrained human rules. These rules model
human knowledge as a database HK represented by key/value
pairs that can be updated and queried by any agent, including
the adversary. We refer to these pairs as tag/value pairs to avoid
confusion with cryptographic keys. Tags allow, for example,
differentiating between facts that represent passwords and user
names.
We assign unique tags to messages with the function
Tag : TΣ(X) → TCpub∪{pair}(X), which is a homomorphism
between TΣ(X) and TCpub∪{pair}(X) considered as semi-
groups with respect to the (associative) pairing function. An
explicit construction of the tag function is given in Ap-
pendix C. We add tags to all agent rules that contain a
send or receive event to or from a human role. The tag
assignment is based on the representation of a message in
the human’s role script. In the following, we write ‘varname’
to denote Tag(varname). To illustrate the tags, imagine that
we modify the protocol SimpleProtocol, Figure 2, such that S
communicates with a human H instead of R. For example, for
Rule (S3) in Figure 4, we introduce the tag ‘m2’ as follows:
[AgSt(S, 2, 〈H,m1〉), Insec(〈H,S, 〈‘m2’,m2〉〉)]
Receive(S,sec,H,〈‘m2’,m2〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ [AgSt(S, 3, 〈H,m1,m2〉)]
The untrained-human rules formalize arbitrary behavior of
fallible humans. They define that in every system state the
human’s current knowledge can be sent to any agent, including
the adversary, over any available channel. Similarly, a term can
be received from anyone and stored in the human’s knowledge.
To keep track of the human’s knowledge, we introduce
persistent facts for every message in the human’s knowledge.
!HK(H, 〈t, x〉) denotes that the human H knows the message
x, tagged with t. Figure 5 depicts three untrained-human rules.
At any time, a human can produce a new fresh value x and
store it in his knowledge together with a tag t. This is modeled
by Rule (HR1). The premise Fr(x) of the rule can be produced
in any system state with the fresh rule (F1). A human can
send any message from his knowledge to the network as well
as receive any new message from the network and store it in
his knowledge. Rules (HR2) and (HR3) respectively model the
sending and receiving of a message over an insecure channel.
The model contains analogous rules for the sending and updat-
ing of the human’s knowledge over authentic, confidential, and
secure channels (see Appendix B). To initialize an untrained
human H , we provide a setup rule that produces for every
[Fr(x)]
Fresh(H,〈t,x〉)−−−−−−−−−→ [!HK(H, 〈t, x〉)] (HR1)
[!HK(H, 〈t, x〉)] Send(H,ins,P,〈t,x〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[Outins(〈H,P, 〈t, x〉〉)] (HR2)
[Inins(〈P,H, 〈t, x〉〉)] Receive(H,ins,P,〈t,x〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[!HK(H, 〈t, x〉)] (HR3)
Fig. 5: Untrained-human rules for producing fresh messages,
sending messages to and receiving messages from an insecure
channel.
message x in H’s initial knowledge a fact !HK(H, 〈t, x〉) and
a corresponding action InitK(H, 〈t, x〉).
Similarly to the agent rules, every untrained-human rule is
labeled with an action Start(H, 〈t, x〉), Fresh(H, 〈t, x〉),
Send(H, l, P, 〈t, x〉), or Receive(H, l, P, 〈t, x〉). H denotes
the human agent performing the action, l the channel type, and
P the apparent communication partner. In contrast to actions
not concerning human roles, the last argument not only denotes
the message x, but also its tag t.
B. Infallible and Untrained Humans
Given the agent rules and the untrained-human rules, we
next present how we realize infallible and untrained humans.
The infallible human follows the role specification and is
therefore modeled by the agent rules. That is, except for the
fact that all messages are tagged, he is modeled in the same
manner as all non-human agents. This (unrealistically) strong
model is how human agents are generally modeled.
The untrained human has no knowledge about the protocol
and can blindly follow all instructions given to him. He can
thereby deviate arbitrarily from the protocol specification. The
untrained human agent is therefore modeled by the untrained-
human rules without further restrictions. As a result, no
protocol can ensure the secrecy of messages that the untrained
human knows because the adversary can always query the
human for these messages, e.g. using social engineering.
C. Rule-Based Humans
A rule-based human agent is defined by the guidelines he
follows. An example of such a guideline is “private keys
must be kept secret.” Guidelines are simple statements that
are expected to be remembered and followed by humans in
practice. For example, it is unrealistic for a bank to assume
that all customers know every step of an e-banking procedure.
However, many service providers require in their terms of
service that their customers do not reveal their passwords to
other parties.
Guidelines state what the human must or must not do and
therefore restrict how the human can deviate from the protocol
specification. A rule-based human is formally modeled by the
untrained-human rules together with predicates that exclude
all traces from consideration that do not satisfy the predicates.
NoTell(H, tag) := ∀Send(H, l, P, 〈t,m〉) ∈ tr, t′,m′ :
〈t,m〉 `H 〈t′,m′〉 ⇒ t′ 6= tag
NoTellExcept(H, tag, rtag) :=
∀Send(H, l, P, 〈t,m〉) ∈ tr,m′, R :
InitK(H, 〈rtag,R〉) ∈ tr ∧ 〈t,m〉 `H 〈tag,m′〉
⇒ P = R ∧ (l = sec ∨ l = conf)
NoGet(H, tag) := ∀Receive(H, l, P, 〈t,m〉) ∈ tr, t′,m′ :
〈t,m〉 `H 〈t′,m′〉 ⇒ t′ 6= tag
ICompare(H, tag) :=
∀Receive(H, l, P, 〈t,m〉) ∈ tr,m′ :
〈t,m〉 `H 〈tag,m′〉 ⇒ InitK(H, 〈tag,m′〉) ∈ tr
Fig. 6: Predicates modeling guidelines of a rule-based human.
Such predicates are expressed as axioms in the Tamarin tool.
While one can envision all kinds of guidelines and formalize
the corresponding predicates, in this paper we consider only
four exemplary predicates.
The four predicates we define are relevant for several
reasons. First, they concern three capabilities that are assumed
by standard agents in communication protocols: sending,
receiving, and comparing messages. Second, the predicates
express conditions that must be satisfied in every protocol step
rather than a particular protocol step. We prefer such predicates
because they correspond to simpler guidelines.
In the following, we write 〈t,m〉 `H 〈t′,m′〉 if a hu-
man agent can select the term 〈t′,m′〉 in 〈t,m〉. Formally,
〈t,m〉 `H 〈t′,m′〉 ⇔ ∃i, k : 1 ≤ i ≤ k ∧ t = 〈t1, . . . , tk〉 ∧
m = 〈m1, . . . ,mk〉 ∧ t′ = ti ∧m′ = mi.
Our first predicate, NoTell(H, tag), specifies traces in
which the human H does not send information of type tag
to anyone. This is relevant for achieving message secrecy. For
example, the guideline that private keys must be kept secret is
expressed as NoTell(H, ‘private key’). The formal definition
of the predicate NoTell(H, tag) is shown in Figure 6. It states
that the human H does not send a message 〈t,m〉 that contains
a subterm m′ with the tag tag. Note that all the predicates in
Figure 6 have at least two arguments: the human agent H
that adheres to the corresponding guideline and the tag tag
referring to the type of message that must or must not be used
in the specified manner.
Passwords are another type of information that should not be
publicized. However, prohibiting their communication with the
NoTell predicate is inappropriate for authentication protocols
that require the human to input his password for authenti-
cation. Humans that adhere to the corresponding guideline
cannot successfully complete such protocols. We thus refine
the guideline to require that the human can only send his
password to a designated agent over a confidential or secure
channel, but not to anyone else. The corresponding predicate,
NoTellExcept(H, tag, rtag), states that if the human H as-
sociates an agent R with tag rtag in his initial knowledge,
he never sends a message containing the tag tag to anyone
except to R. Additionally, H can only send this message
on a confidential or secure channel. In the predicate’s formal
definition, shown in Figure 6, we make use of the action fact
InitK that denotes a term in the human’s initial knowledge.
The predicate NoGet(H, tag), shown in Figure 6, states that
the human H rejects any message that contains the tag tag. In
particular, if a human H rejects a message, this message can-
not update the human’s knowledge with a fact that originates
from another agent. The corresponding guideline helps protect
the integrity of some types of information. A common attack,
for instance, is to disguise malicious software as a security
update of a popular software package. A safe update method
is to use the software’s built-in update mechanism. Humans
should therefore only use the built-in mechanism and not
follow a suggested link to an updater. This can be expressed
with the predicate NoGet(H, ‘update link’).
Humans are known to skip verification steps. A human
asked to confirm a transaction is likely to proceed without
paying close attention to details. Stating a guideline that
requires the human to pay attention is not a satisfactory
solution. A simple technique to make a human pay more
attention is to ask him for input and afterward provide him
with information that must be verified along with a random
code used for confirmation. Some humans may of course still
ignore the comparison and simply enter the code, but others
will not. Our final predicate distinguishes between these two
types of humans. The ICompare(H, tag) predicate states that
whenever the human H receives a message with tag tag, he
compares it to the message associated with the same tag in his
initial knowledge. The effect of this predicate, in combination
with the untrained human rules, is that the human agent either
ignores the entire message or verifies the tagged subterm.
Summarizing, these four predicates allow us to model
human agents that never send or receive a message, or
always perform certain comparisons. Furthermore, we have
illustrated on the example of NoTell , that the correspond-
ing guidelines can be made more specific when necessary.
The NoTellExcept(H, tag, rtag) predicate describes the same
property as NoTell(H, tag) but allows us to make an ex-
ception for a trusted agent associated with the tag rtag. In
a similar manner, the other guidelines could be made more
specific. However, as we will show in the next sections,
humans who follow the rules introduced here are sufficiently
strong to avoid many attacks.
D. Errors of other Fallible Humans
We have introduced the means to formalize all roles ap-
pearing in the protocol specification. In addition, we allow for
an arbitrary number of untrained human agents. We thereby
single out a distinguished human agent for which we examine
the security properties. This distinguished human can be an
0. H : knows(D,P, S, pw, idH, idS)
0. D : knows(H, idH,pk(skS))
0. S : knows(skS,H, idS, pw, idH)
1. H •−→• P : S
2. P ◦−→• S : ‘start’
3. S •−→• P : fresh(rS).idS, rS
4. P •−→• D : idS, rS
5. D •−→• H : idS
6. H •−→• D : pw, idH
7. D •−→• P : fresh(rD).aenc(rD, pk(skS)),
senc(〈f(rS), idH, pw〉, f(rS, rD))
8. P •−→• S : aenc(rD,pk(skS)),
senc(〈f(rS), idH, pw〉, f(rS, rD))
9. S •−→• P : senc(f(rD), f(rS, rD))
10. P •−→• D : senc(f(rD), f(rS, rD))
11. D •−→• H : ‘success’
Fig. 7: MP-Auth protocol
instantiation of any human definition. The additional human
agents that we allow for are always untrained. This models
that an adversary can trick as many humans as he wants
into blindly following his instructions when this helps him
to attack the distinguished human. Our model is thus a Dolev-
Yao model with untrained humans and a distinguished test
human that may be infallible, untrained, or guided by one or
more of the rules that we introduced.
V. CASE STUDY IN PROTOCOL ANALYSIS
To validate the utility of our approach, we illustrate how
it can be used to automatically find attacks that arise from
human errors. We first present the authentication protocol MP-
Auth [18] and then analyze whether it provides entity and
message authentication from a human to a remote server. In
the next section, we compare it to five other protocols that
have the same aim, but are based on different mechanisms.
MP-Auth authenticates a human H to a server S using the
human’s platform P and his personal device D, to which
the human has exclusive access. A simplified version of this
protocol, obtained by merging H and D into a single role, was
shown to provide mutual authentication between D and S and
to establish a secret symmetric session key between these two
parties [18].
The main idea of the protocol, shown in Figure 7, is that
a human never needs to enter his password on the platform
that may be controlled by an adversary. The device D has the
public key of the server S preinstalled. We first explain the
protocol in detail and then analyze it with respect to entity
and message authentication. Afterward, we present a version
of the protocol that incorporates a method to harden protocols
against human errors and we analyze its effectiveness.
The protocol (Figure 7) proceeds as follows: in Step 1, the
human enters the name of the server he wants to communicate
with on the platform P . P then initiates communication with
the server S (Step 2). Next, S produces a fresh value rS and
sends this, together with its identity information idS via the
platform P to device D (Steps 3 and 4). We assume that the
short-range network connection between D and P is secure.
In Step 5, D displays idS to the human, who checks if this
corresponds to the server he wants to communicate with. If
it does, he enters his password pw and identity idH on the
device. Upon receiving this message, the device produces a
fresh nonce rD and encrypts it with the public key of S.
D applies the hash function f to rS and concatenates it with
idH and pw. Then, D encrypts the concatenated message with
f(rS, rD) and the two encrypted messages are sent together
to the platform P , which relays them to the server S (Steps 7
and 8). The last three steps authenticate the server S to the
human H . They are not relevant for entity authentication from
H to S but will be relevant for message authentication in the
next section. In Steps 9 and 10, S applies f to the received rD
and sends it, encrypted with f(rS, rD), over P back to D. D
checks if rD corresponds to the nonce that it has previously
sent and indicates ‘success’ to the human if it does.
We model that D is preconfigured with the public key of S
by including this key in D’s initial knowledge. Furthermore,
we assume the existence of secure channels between H and P
as well as between H and D. The first connection from P to S
is confidential, while the following communication is secure.
This models a TLS connection between the two parties.
In the following analysis, we make the realistic assumption
that the platform P is under the adversary’s control, i.e.,
corrupt. We assume that the human only launches applications
on a malware-free device D and therefore do not consider D
to be corrupt. We model P by omitting its agent rules from the
specification. Instead, we model every message that is either
sent or received by P as being received from or sent to the
insecure network that is controlled by the adversary.
A. Analysis
We analyze the MP-Auth protocol with the Tamarin tool
with respect to both an infallible and an untrained human.
The infallible human serves as a best case scenario: If a
protocol does not satisfy a property with an infallible human,
it will also not satisfy the property with an untrained human.
Whenever a property holds for an infallible human, but not
for an untrained one, we also examine what rules must be
known by a rule-based human for the property to be satisfied.
Whenever a property is proven by Tamarin, we only state this
and refer to the Tamarin files [6] for the detailed specifications,
assumptions, and proofs.
We first analyze if entity, device, and message authenti-
cation hold in the MP-Auth protocol. Afterward, we suggest
improvements to the protocol and analyze their effectiveness.
1) Entity and Device Authentication: First, we examine if
entity authentication and device authentication hold for the
different kinds of human agents. The assumption for device
authentication is that the human always carries the device D
on him and has exclusive access to it.
Claim 1. MP-Auth provides entity authentication and device
authentication from the human H to the server S for an
infallible human but neither property for an untrained human.
Proof. For an infallible human, the two properties are proven
by Tamarin. In contrast, for an untrained human Tamarin
finds attacks for both properties, which can be interpreted
as follows: the untrained human can enter his password on
the corrupted platform before S is active, even if this is not
foreseen in the specification. An adversary can thus learn the
password and therefore generate all messages that S expects
(Steps 2 and 8 in Figure 7). This attack is possible in a trace
where the human is only active before the first action of S
and the human’s device is not active at all. Consequently, both
entity and device authentication fail.
We therefore examine a rule-based human, who knows that
he must send passwords, i.e., messages tagged with ‘pw’, only
to the device ‘D’, to which he has a secure channel, and not
to anyone else. We use Tamarin to establish the following:
Claim 2. MP-Auth provides entity authentication, as well as
device authentication, from the human H to the server S for a
rule-based human who knows he can only enter the password
on the device to which he has a secure channel, expressed by
NoTellExcept(H, ‘pw’, ‘D’).
2) Message Authentication: [18] describes additional steps
to authenticate transactions, which are depicted as Steps 12–
19 in Figure 8. After the login phase, a human H can enter his
message m on the platform P , which relays it to the server S.
S produces a fresh nonce rS2 and encrypts it and the message
m with the key f(rS, rD). Then S sends the result over P to
the device D which can decrypt it. D displays m to H and
waits for his confirmation, OK, that this is the message that
H previously sent. Then D computes the function f over rS2
and m, encrypts it, and sends it over P back to S.
The final protocol for sending a message m authentically
from H to S consists of the Steps 1–11 in Figure 7 followed
by the Steps 12–19 in Figure 8. We examine whether the
second part of the protocol, which we call MP-Auth_MA,
satisfies the message authentication property. However, we
take into account that at the time when m is sent there has
already been a login protocol. Therefore, the communicating
agents already share some knowledge at the beginning of MP-
Auth_MA. Next, we justify why we can assume this shared
initial knowledge.
Analysis with Tamarin shows that with an infallible human,
after the first part, D and S agree on the value of H and on
the value of their shared key f(rS, rD). More specifically, S
can be sure to share these messages with another agent, but
does not necessarily know with which other agent. This is
because S never learns what device D is participating in the
same protocol. However, D can be sure with which server S it
has an agreement. We call this security property a weak data
agreement between D and S and refer to Definitions 5 and 6
of Appendix A for its formal definition. Further examination
shows that the same property also holds for a rule-based
human who knows that he can only send his password to
the device. We thus assume that the human was at least
behaving according to this rule in the first part and analyze
0. H : knows(D,P, S,m, idH, idS,OK)
0. D : knows(H, idH,pk(skS), idS, S, rS, rD)
0. S : knows(skS,H, idS, idH, rS, rD)
12. H •−→• P : m
13. P •−→• S : m
14. S •−→• P : fresh(rS2).senc(〈m, rS2〉, f(rS, rD))
15. P •−→• D : senc(〈m, rS2〉, f(rS, rD))
16. D •−→• H : m
17. H •−→• D : OK
18. D •−→• P : senc(f(m, rS2), f(rS, rD))
19. P •−→• S : senc(f(m, rS2), f(rS, rD))
Fig. 8: MP-Auth_MA protocol
MP-Auth_MA with the shared initial knowledge of D and
S as depicted in Figure 8. Consequently, we use the term
“untrained-human” here to denote a human who behaves
arbitrarily in the new part of the protocol only.
Claim 3. MP-Auth_MA provides message authentication of
m from the human H to the server S for an infallible human,
but not for an untrained one.
Proof. Message authentication for an infallible human is
proven by Tamarin. In contrast, Tamarin finds an attack with
an untrained human that can be interpreted as follows: An
adversary can send his own m′ to the server S, which will
therefore be displayed by D. However, an untrained human
presses OK without reading the display, and thereby confirms
the message m′ from the adversary.
To avoid this attack, a human must not press OK unless he
has received his message m from the device in the previous
step. However, this cannot be expressed with the set of guide-
lines defined in Section IV-C and we show in Appendix D
that the MP-Auth_MA protocol does not provide message
authentication for any combination of these guidelines.
The above attack is possible because the human does not
read his device’s display. If he is forced to read the display
to proceed in the protocol, then he can no longer ignore it.
Next, we analyze an improved version of the protocol that
incorporates this idea.
B. MP-Auth_VC
We call the improved protocol MP-Auth_VC, which incor-
porates a verification code, and we explain it on an example.
Imagine that the human H wants his bank server S to carry out
a transaction m. We model m to be in H’s initial knowledge.
In practice, H could remember the transaction information by
writing the details down on paper.
Remark. By modeling the message m in the human’s knowl-
edge, we assume that the information noted on paper reflects
the human’s intention and that he will not misinterpret it. 4
In the original protocol in Figure 8, the device displays in
Step 16 all transaction details m, and the human confirms
them by pressing an OK button in Step 17. We suggest that
Steps 16 and 17 are replaced by the following two steps.
16. D •−→• H : fresh(vc).vc,m
17. H •−→• D : vc
Instead of displaying just the transaction details, the device
additionally displays “if this is your message, please confirm
by entering the following verification code.” The code should
be fresh and unpredictable in every protocol run. We model
this by Step 16 above, where D sends m together with a fresh
verification code vc to the human. The protocol only proceeds
if the human enters vc on the device, as in Step 17. A human
in this protocol cannot ignore what is displayed on the device
and just press OK. Instead, he is forced to read the display
to learn vc. Nevertheless, there is an attack possible with an
untrained human.
Claim 4. MP-Auth_VC provides message authentication of
m from a human H to a server S for an infallible human, but
not for an untrained one.
Proof. Tamarin proves message authentication for an infallible
human. Tamarin finds an attack for an untrained human, which
can be interpreted in the context of our transaction example
as follows: An adversary can trigger his own transaction m′.
Consequently, the corresponding transaction details are dis-
played by the device D. However, an untrained human ignores
that m′ should represent his transaction details. Therefore, he
wrongly enters vc on the device and confirms the adversary’s
transaction.
To avoid this attack, we consider a rule-based human who
checks at each step where he receives a message m with the
tag ‘m’, whether this corresponds to the message associated
with ‘m’ in his initial knowledge. This is expressed by the
guideline ICompare(H, ‘m’). In our example, this means that
whenever the human reads on the display a transaction, he
checks that the corresponding information is the transaction
information he previously noted on paper. Tamarin establishes
the following claim.
Claim 5. MP-Auth_VC provides message authentication of
m from a human H to a server S for a rule-based human
who knows that whenever he receives a message containing x
with tag ‘m’, he must check if x corresponds to the message
associated with ‘m’ in his initial knowledge, expressed by
ICompare(H, ‘m’).
The improved protocol is thus secure with respect to a rule-
based human who performs certain checks. This is because,
unlike the original version, it is not possible for the human to
ignore the displayed information altogether.
C. Conclusion from Case Study
We have demonstrated that we can use our model to auto-
matically find realistic attacks that are caused by human errors.
We considered untrained, rule-based, and infallible humans
and showed that entity and device authentication do not hold
with untrained humans but hold with rule-based ones.
When considering message authentication, we have seen
how attacks arise when humans do not perform certain checks.
We have therefore suggested an improved version of the
protocol that enforces such a check. Our analysis shows that
this improvement is only effective with a rule-based human.
Our model can thus help to find ways to avoid human errors
by improving the protocol specifications and the guidelines
that humans must follow.
The argument that one protocol improves another is de-
pendent on the set of guidelines we chose in our model. We
posit that our four rules provide a good basis for analyzing
protocols. They model general guidelines that express what a
human must or must not do in every moment. In reality it is
expected that humans behave according to such guidelines, for
example that they perform basic checks.
VI. COMPARING AUTHENTICATION PROTOCOLS
In this section, we use our model to make fine-grained
distinctions between protocols that appear equally secure in
the absence of human errors. We compare six mobile phone-
based authentication protocols that all aim to authenticate a
human to a server but use different mechanisms to achieve
this goal.
In addition to MP-Auth, we examine the protocols
Cronto [1], Google 2-Step [2], OTP over SMS, and Phool-
proof [22]. These protocols were compared by Bonneau et
al. [8] using a framework to analyze protocols designed to
replace password-based authentication. The framework com-
pares how usable, deployable, and secure the protocols are. We
also consider the recently proposed protocol Sound-Proof [16]
that is also phone-based. We analyze whether each of the
protocols provides entity, device, and message authentication
from the human H to the server S.
In each protocol, a human H wants to authenticate himself
to a server S. For this purpose, he has access to a platform P ,
through which he communicates with the server, and he also
has exclusive access to a personal device D, like a cell phone.
As in the previous section, where not stated otherwise, we
assume that the channels between H and P as well as between
H and D are secure, that the first connection from P to S is
confidential, and that the subsequent communication between
P and S is secure (modeling TLS). Also like in the previous
section, we assume that the platform is under the adversary’s
control. Again, we analyze the protocols using Tamarin and
consider an infallible and an untrained human. A rule-based
human is considered when the results for the infallible and
untrained human differ.
First, we explain why we examine both entity and message
authentication in all protocols. Afterward, we present the
protocols and our results.
A. Entity and Message Authentication
Normally it is a small step to achieve message authenti-
cation when entity authentication holds. However, when we
take human errors into consideration, this step is no longer
straightforward. For this reason, it is necessary to also examine
message authentication.
Message authentication is often easily achieved when an
entity has already been authenticated that is associated with a
key. In a setting with two non-human entities A and B, A can
encrypt every message with the previously authenticated key
that B knows belongs to A. However, this no longer works
when a human agent H is authenticated because end-to-end
encryption is not possible. Even if a server S has correctly
authenticated H , H can leave his platform and another human
H ′ can take over and send commands to S. As the platform
P is an intermediate party between H and S, S has no means
of detecting this if additional authentication is not done. This
problem has already been considered in the context of many
password change mechanisms: When a user is already logged
in, he must reenter his password prior to setting a new one.
This prevents someone else from changing the password in
his name, for example during his absence from the platform.
Remark. The platform P could continually check if the human
is still present, for example using a camera or similar tech-
niques. However, with this approach, the hardware making this
check must be trusted and function error-free. In particular, we
consider a corrupted platform. In this case, letting the platform
check whether the user has changed does not help the server.
4
From the discussion above we see that even after a success-
ful login, the server must check if message authentication is
given after every transaction, or after a batch of transactions.
B. Protocols and Results
We start by briefly introducing the protocols. We refer to
Section V for the description of MP-Auth and to Appendix E
for more details and the specifications of the other protocols.
Cronto is a challenge-response protocol, where the server
encrypts a fresh nonce in the form of a cryptogram, a graphical
representation of a cipher text, that is displayed on the human’s
platform. The human uses his auxiliary device to scan the
cryptogram. The device then decrypts it and computes a one-
time password from the extracted information that is displayed
to the human. The human must enter the one-time password,
together with his normal password, on the platform.
The Google 2-Step protocol models Google’s two-factor au-
thentication. After the human enters his identity and password,
he receives from the server a fresh code on a second channel.
For example, he receives an SMS, i.e., a text message, that
is sent to his mobile phone. The human must then enter this
code on the platform.
Similarly, OTP over SMS is a challenge-response protocol
where the server sends a one-time password (OTP) to the
human over his device. The one-time password that the human
then enters on the platform is a single factor for authentication.
Phoolproof is the only protocol we examine that does not
start with the step where the human tells his platform to which
server he wants to connect. This avoids the human directing
his platform to connect to a corrupt server. Instead, the human
selects on his device the server from a list of registered servers
and the device communicates this choice to the platform. The
Entity Auth. Device Auth. Message Auth.
I U R-B I U R-B I U R-B
Cronto X X X X
Cronto_MA X × X(2)
Google 2-Step X X X X X × X(2)
MP-Auth X × X(1) X × X(1)
MP-Auth_MA X × ×
MP-Auth_VC X × X(2)
OTP over SMS X X X X X × X(2)
Phoolproof × × X X X X
Sound-Proof × × X X ×
(1) with rule NoTellExcept(H, ‘pw’, ‘D’)
(2) with rule ICompare(H, ‘m’)
TABLE I: Entity authentication (Entity Auth.), device authen-
tication (Device Auth.), and message authentication (Message
Auth.) of human H to server S, with an infallible (I), untrained
(U), and rule-based (R-B) human.
device and the server then authenticate each other by a signed
challenge-response mechanism. Only after this does the human
enter his password on the platform to log in.
Sound-Proof is based on the idea that something that
identifiably belongs to the human, namely his device, must
be in close proximity to the platform used by the human.
Whether the device and platform are actually near each
other is decided by measuring ambient noise. If the noise
measured by both the platform and the device are roughly the
same, then they are deemed to be at the same location. The
comparison of the two recordings is performed by the device.
Table I shows the results established with Tamarin. The
three parts indicate whether the protocols satisfy the
properties entity authentication, device authentication, and
message authentication from the human to the server, for an
infallible human (I) and for an untrained one (U). Whenever
the property holds for an infallible but not for an untrained
human, we examine if it holds for a rule-based human (R-B).
A tick X in the table means that the respective authentication
property from H to S holds, and × indicates that it fails.
The numbers following the ticks reference what rule must be
known by the rule-based human, listed at the table’s bottom.
Next, we present the most interesting results.
1) Entity and Device Authentication: We first discuss which
protocols provide entity authentication. Tamarin establishes:
Claim 6. Cronto, Google 2-Step, and OTP over SMS provide
entity authentication from a human H to a server S for an
infallible human and for an untrained human.
Entity authentication holds in these protocols because the
human must read from his device the one-time password or
fresh code from the server and enter it on the platform.
Claim 7. Sound-Proof and Phoolproof neither provide entity
authentication from a human H to a server S for an infallible
human nor for an untrained human.
Proof. Tamarin finds attacks for both protocols with an infal-
lible as well as with an untrained human.
We present an interpretation of the attacks with infallible hu-
mans. This attack also works, of course, for untrained humans.
In Sound-Proof, even if the protocol proceeds as intended, the
human H is only active before the first event of the server S.
This participation need not, however, be recent (as defined
in Section III-D). In Phoolproof, entity authentication fails
because the adversary can learn the human’s password when
he enters it on a corrupted platform in a protocol run prior to
the moment when S starts. The password can then be replayed
by the adversary at the point of the protocol where S expects
to receive it, and thus H need not be active between the start
and end of S.
Since entity authentication fails, we also examine device
authentication (see Section III-D) for these two protocols.
For device authentication, we require that a human H has
exclusive access to his device D, which he always carries on
him. We prove with Tamarin:
Claim 8. Sound-Proof and Phoolproof provide device authen-
tication of H to S for an infallible and an untrained human.
Intuitively, Phoolproof satisfies this property because H’s
device D must participate in the protocol to send the signed
challenge back to S. Similarly, it holds in Sound-Proof be-
cause the device D communicates over a secure channel to S
that the two recordings are equal.
2) Message Authentication: A variation of the Cronto pro-
tocol can be used for transaction authentication. As it is not
clear from the protocol’s description whether this can only be
done after a login, we examine it as a separate protocol without
login. We name this variation of the protocol Cronto_MA and
examine whether it provides message authentication. In this
version of the protocol, the one-time password is based on
both a fresh nonce and the message sent by the human. Also,
no password, in addition to the one-time password, must be
entered by the human. All remaining protocols do not specify
how to authenticate a message m. Nevertheless, as message
authentication is important, we examine if the protocol steps
can be enhanced to provide this property.
For this purpose, we introduce a fresh message m that is
only known by the human H at the protocols’ start and extend
the protocols with m using the results of Basin et al. [5] on
human-interaction security protocol (HISP) topologies. HISP
topologies consist of four parties: an infallible human, his
personal device, the human’s platform, and a server. The
human can access his device and his platform, through which
he can communicate with the server. The assumption is that
the platform is always corrupt. This setup matches with all
our protocols when we consider infallible humans.
We use the results of [5] as follows. Minimal HISP topolo-
gies state necessary conditions for message authentication.
Thus, for each of the protocols, we must add the message
m to a set of communication channels that covers one of the
minimal topologies. Otherwise, we know that it is impossible
to achieve message authentication even with an infallible
human. We refer to Appendix E for the resulting protocols
in Alice&Bob specification.
Claim 9. It is impossible to use Sound-Proof for message
authentication with an infallible human and a corrupted
platform.
Proof. It is not possible to cover a minimal HISP topology
in this protocol, even if m is added to every message. By
Theorem 2 of [5], it follows that with this protocol it is
impossible to achieve message authentication with a corrupted
platform.
Claim 10. Cronto_MA, Google 2-Step, and OTP over SMS
provide message authentication of m from a human H to a
server S for an infallible human, but not for an untrained
human.
Proof. Tamarin proves message authentication for an infallible
human. Furthermore, in all three protocols, Tamarin finds
attacks for an untrained human, which can be interpreted
as follows: An adversary can send his own message m′ to
the server. Consequently, m′ will be displayed on the device
together with the one-time password in Cronto_MA and OTP
over SMS, and together with the fresh code in Google 2-Step.
An untrained human reads this challenge from his device and
enters it on the platform without checking the corresponding
message. With this, he confirms any message m′ of the
adversary. In Google 2-Step, the adversary additionally must
know the password, which he learns when the human enters
it on the corrupt platform.
We next consider these protocols with a rule-based human
who knows that every time he reads information about a
message with tag ‘m’, he must check if this message is the
one associated with ‘m’ in his initial knowledge. This means
that a human will only copy the server’s challenge from the
device to the platform if it is sent together with the transaction
that he intended to make. We establish with Tamarin:
Claim 11. Cronto_MA, Google 2-Step, and OTP over SMS
provide message authentication of m from a human H to a
server S for a rule-based human who knows that whenever he
receives a message containing x with tag ‘m’, he must check
if x corresponds to the message associated with ‘m’ in his
initial knowledge, expressed by ICompare(H, ‘m’).
We next show with Tamarin that the protocol Phoolproof
is the only protocol that achieves message authentication even
with an untrained human.
Claim 12. The Phoolproof protocol provides message authen-
tication of m from a human H to a server S for an infallible
as well as for an untrained human.
The human not only enters the name of the server S but
also the message m on the device D. D then signs S and m
before sending them over the corrupt platform P to S. The
adversary cannot forge D’s signature and therefore cannot alter
the message m that is sent by the human.
C. Discussion
Our case studies show that we can use our model and
automated reasoning support to find realistic attacks arising
from human errors. We can also use them to compare the
resilience of protocols to such attacks, where the protocols
exploit different defense mechanisms. Table I shows that
three of the six protocols analyzed (Cronto, Google 2-Step,
and OTP over SMS) provide entity authentication even with
untrained humans. The protocols Phoolproof and Sound-Proof
provide device authentication with untrained humans. MP-
Auth provides entity and device authentication only with rule-
based humans.
Phoolproof is the only protocol that provides message
authentication with untrained humans. At the other extreme,
Sound-Proof cannot be used for message authentication at all.
All other protocols, except MP-Auth_MA, provide message
authentication for rule-based humans, but not for untrained
ones. In all of these protocols, the human must check whether a
displayed message is one that he has previously sent. We have
proposed an improved version of MP-Auth_MA that forces a
human to read the display. However, as we have observed,
untrained humans can still fail to compare the relevant parts.
The Cronto and Phoolproof protocols have been rated equal
in all security categories by Bonneau et al. [8]. By taking
human errors into account, we have further differentiated them:
While Cronto provides entity authentication, Phoolproof only
provides device authentication. However, if Phoolproof was
used for message authentication, it would be secure even with
untrained humans. In contrast, the variation Cronto_MA only
satisfies message authentication with rule-based humans.
VII. RELATED WORK
Smith [26] observed over a decade ago that although the
opinion is widely held that many security problems are caused
by the interaction of humans with computers, the analysis and
design of security protocols usually focus on just the computer
parts. Today, human-computer interaction is an active research
area, also in the domain of Information Security. We focus
here mainly on related work concerned with formal models
for Information Security that include fallible humans.
Carlos et al. [9] model the human formally as part of a
security ceremony [14] in which a protocol is analyzed. They
introduce a human agent that can store knowledge and send
and receive messages over different media corresponding to
either human-to-human or human-to-machine communication.
This is similar to the untrained human that we consider, in
that we also model the human’s knowledge and rules used
to send and receive new knowledge facts. While we use the
same channels for all communication, [9] distinguishes the
events communicated over different media. It is unclear how
their framework can be instantiated with an actual security
protocol. Moreover, although they provide a formal human
model, human errors are not explicitly covered.
Rukše˙nas et al. [24] propose a formal human model that
allows for human errors. Their focus is on finding errors that
stem from the design of the interface between a standard hu-
man user and a system. They do not consider communication
protocols. Rather, they consider scenarios where the interac-
tion between one system, one human (and his interpretation
of the system), and one specific adversary is analyzed.
Beckert and Beuster [7] share a similar viewpoint to [24] in
that they also examine scenarios with human-machine inter-
faces. They give a formal semantics to a known psychological
human model, a variation of the GOMS model [15], and
also model the user’s assumptions about the application. The
resulting model of human-computer interaction consists of the
human model, the user’s assumptions, and a formal application
model. When reasoning about human errors, they use what
we called the skilled human model in Section II. That is, they
explicitly model that a user can behave incorrectly or that he
can misinterpret the system’s state.
Both Rukše˙nas et al. [24] and Beckert and Beuster [7] only
consider scenarios with a fixed number of agents. In contrast,
our model allows arbitrary many instantiations of the roles and
of untrained humans and supports unbounded verification.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We have formalized security protocols with fallible humans,
mechanized their analysis within the Tamarin tool, and con-
ducted case studies on various authentication protocols. We
demonstrated that our model can be used to analyze what
guidelines must be given for humans to securely execute a
protocol. Such insights can serve as a starting point to priori-
tize the security information that must be given to non-expert
users in practice. We also showed that our model allows us to
make fine distinctions between protocols that were previously
considered equally secure. The consideration of human errors
therefore adds a new dimension to the classification of security
protocols.
There are several directions for future work and we highlight
two of them. First we have formalized guidelines for rule-
based humans that have proven useful for our case studies.
Nevertheless, other guidelines are conceivable. However, to
develop and compare guidelines, we must first find useful
evaluation criteria.
Second we have presented two approaches for human error
analysis based on skilled and rule-based humans. However,
most humans do not neatly fit into one of these types. A more
realistic human error model should consider the combination
of the skilled and rule-based approaches. However, such a
model dramatically increases the number of possible system
behaviors and we must therefore find strategies to cope with
the resulting verification complexity.
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APPENDIX
A. Formal Security Properties
We now formally define all the security properties we used.
As in Lowe [17], we use the actions Running(A,B,m) and
Commit(A,B,m) to denote that a non-human agent A has
certain beliefs about her apparent communication partner B
and about the message m.
Entity authentication of an agent H to another agent S
holds if whenever S commits to H , H has taken some action
between the start of S and the claim. This corresponds to the
recent aliveness property of Cremers and Mauw [11].
Definition 2. A protocol model R satisfies the entity authen-
tication property if
∀tr ∈ TR(R), S,H,m, tr′, tr′′ :
tr = tr′·Commit(S,H,m) · tr′′
⇒ ∃tr1, tr2, i, l, P,m2 : tr′ = tr1 · tr2 ∧Start(S, i) ∈ tr1∧
(Send(H, l, P,m2) ∈ tr2 ∨ Receive(H, l, P,m2) ∈ tr2
∨ Fresh(H,m2) ∈ tr2 ∨ Start(H,m2) ∈ tr2).
For the special case of authenticating a human H to a server
S, we define device authentication. Under the assumption that
H has exclusive access to a device D and always carries D
on him, this property holds if: whenever S commits to H ,
the device D that belongs to H has performed some action
between the start of S and the claim. To denote that the
device D belongs to the human H , we introduce the action
Device(H,D).
Definition 3. A protocol model R satisfies the device authen-
tication property if
∀tr ∈ TR(R), S,H,m, tr′, tr′′ :
tr = tr′·Commit(S,H,m) · tr′′
⇒ ∃tr1, tr2, D, i, l, P,m2 : tr′ = tr1 · tr2∧
Start(S, i) ∈ tr1 ∧ Device(H,D) ∈ tr′∧
(Send(D, l, P,m2) ∈ tr2 ∨ Receive(D, l, P,m2) ∈ tr2
∨ Fresh(D,m2) ∈ tr2 ∨ Start(D,m2) ∈ tr2).
We define message authentication from a human H to
another agent S as: whenever S commits to H and to a
message m, then H has previously sent the message m.
More specifically, H could have sent m as part of a larger,
concatenated message. To denote this, we use the function `H
as introduced in Section IV-C.
Definition 4. A protocol model R satisfies the message
authentication property if
∀tr ∈ TR(R), S,H,m, tr′, tr′′ :
tr = tr′·Commit(S,H,m)· tr′′
⇒ ∃l, P, t′,m′, t : Send(H, l, P, 〈t′,m′〉) ∈ tr′
∧ 〈t′,m′〉 `H 〈t,m〉.
We define a weaker form of Lowe’s [17] data agreement.
Weak data agreement between two non-human agents S and R
on a message m holds if: Whenever S commits to a message
m, there is an agent R that has previously claimed Running
with respect to the same m.
Definition 5. A protocol model R satisfies the weak data
agreement property if
∀tr ∈ TR(R), S,R′,m, tr′, tr′′ :
tr = tr′·Commit(S,R′,m)· tr′′
⇒ ∃R,S′ : Running(R,S′,m) ∈ tr′.
Note that even though S can be sure that there is an agent
R with which he agrees on the value of m, he need not know
who R is. We say agent S knows with whom he has a weak
data agreement if the same property holds and the Running
claim is performed by the agent R to which S commits.
Definition 6. A protocol model R satisfies the weak data
agreement property and agent S knows with whom he has
an agreement if
∀tr ∈ TR(R), S,R,m, tr′, tr′′ :
tr = tr′·Commit(S,R,m)· tr′′
⇒ ∃S′ : Running(R,S′,m) ∈ tr′.
Finally, for secrecy we define two new actions: The action
Secret(S,m) is a claim that denotes that the agent S
believes the message m to be secret. The action K(m) denotes
that the adversary knows the message m. Secrecy holds if
whenever an agent S believes that the message m is secret,
the adversary has not learned the message m.
Definition 7. A protocol model R satisfies the secrecy prop-
erty if
∀tr ∈ TR(R), S,m : Secret(S,m) ∈ tr ⇒ K(m) /∈ tr.
B. Remaining Untrained Human Rules
In Section IV-A, we presented the untrained-human rules
for generating fresh facts and storing them in the human’s
knowledge, as well as for sending and receiving facts over
insecure channels. We now present the remaining untrained-
human rules. Figure 9 depicts the untrained-human rules for
sending and receiving facts over channels that are secure
(Rules (HR4) and (HR5)), authentic (Rules (HR6) and (HR7)),
and confidential (Rules (HR8) and (HR9)). The only differ-
ences are the kind of In and Out facts in the premise and
conclusion, respectively. All In and Out facts have the same
[!HK(H, 〈t, x〉)] Send(H,sec,P,〈t,x〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[Outsec(〈H,P, 〈t, x〉〉)] (HR4)
[Insec(〈P,H, 〈t, x〉〉)] Receive(H,sec,P,〈t,x〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[!HK(H, 〈t, x〉)] (HR5)
[!HK(H, 〈t, x〉)] Send(H,auth,P,〈t,x〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[Outauth(〈H,P, 〈t, x〉〉)] (HR6)
[Inauth(〈P,H, 〈t, x〉〉)] Receive(H,auth,P,〈t,x〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[!HK(H, 〈t, x〉)] (HR7)
[!HK(H, 〈t, x〉)] Send(H,conf,P,〈t,x〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[Outconf(〈H,P, 〈t, x〉〉)] (HR8)
[Inconf(〈P,H, 〈t, x〉〉)] Receive(H,conf,P,〈t,x〉)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
[!HK(H, 〈t, x〉)] (HR9)
Fig. 9: Untrained-human rules for sending messages to and
receiving messages from secure, authentic, and confidential
channels.
structure: The first argument A denotes the sender, the second
argument B the receiver, and the third one the message m
with its tag t.
C. Tags
We formally define how tags are assigned to the terms in
the protocol specification. We only need the tags to denote the
human’s interpretation of messages. A human can only con-
catenate messages and split concatenated messages. Therefore,
we define a tagging function that gives an interpretation to the
messages that are part of a larger concatenated term.
First, we define a function t(m) that assigns a tag to every
atomic message m. That is, every public and fresh constant
as well as every variable and function symbol is assigned a
unique tag. We then inductively define tags for composed mes-
sages as follows. Whenever a message consists of a function f
applied to arguments a1, ..., an, the message’s tag consists of
the tag for the function symbol f concatenated with the tags
of a1, ..., an. We then map the resulting concatenated tags to
public constants. Finally, we define the function Tag(m). If
the top level function of a message m consists of a pairing
function with arguments m1 and m2, then the final tag of m
is a pair consisting of the tags of m1 and m2. Whenever the
top level function is not a pair, the message is tagged with the
public constant as previously defined.
Formally, we first choose an injective function t(m) : Σ ∪
X → L that assigns a unique term from the countably infinite
set of tags L to every symbol in Σ and X . Then we inductively
define the injective function T (m) : TΣ(X)→ L∗ as follows.
T (m) =

t(m) if m ∈ Σ ∪X
t(f)·T (a1)· ...·T (an) if m = f(a1, ..., an),
f ∈ Fsym , ai ∈ TΣ(X).
This function assigns to every term m a sequence of tags.
Since L∗ and Cpub are countably infinite sets, there is an
injective function i : L∗ → Cpub . We define preTag(m) :
TΣ(X) → Cpub as a composition of the functions i and T .
Finally, we construct an injective function
Tag(m) : TΣ(X)→ TCpub∪{pair}(X)
such that Tag(m) satisfies the equation Tag(〈m1,m2〉) =
〈Tag(m1), Tag(m2)〉. The construction is given by
Tag(m) =
{
〈Tag(m1), Tag(m2)〉 if m = 〈m1,m2〉
preTag(m) otherwise.
D. MP-Auth_MA with Rule-Based Humans
We give a precise statement and proof for the fact that
MP-Auth_MA does not provide message authentication from
a human to a server for any rule-based human with the given
guidelines in our model.
The purpose of the MP-Auth_MA protocol is the authen-
ticated transmission of a message from the human H to the
server S. The associated security property, message authen-
tication, is formally stated in Definition 4. This property is
trivially satisfied if S never performs a commit claim. A
guideline that prevents the execution of the protocol leads
therefore to a trivially satisfied authentication claim. Such a
guideline is not useful, however, since it does not achieve
the protocol’s purpose. We are therefore only interested in
guidelines that allow the human to execute the protocol in a
manner that the protocol’s purpose is achieved. Formally, for
every security property that is universally quantified over the
set of all protocol traces we define a corresponding function-
ality property that is existentially quantified over the set of
all protocol traces. For example, the functionality property of
a message authentication protocol is satisfied if there exists
a trace that reaches the commit claim and satisfies message
authentication. We then say that a protocol non-vacuously
satisfies a security property, if it satisfies both the security
property and the corresponding functionality property.
We can now state the claim that our exemplary set of
guidelines is insufficient for MP-Auth_MA to satisfy message
authentication from the human to the server.
Claim 13. There is no combination of the NoTell ,
NoTellExcept , NoGet , and ICompare guidelines for the rule-
based human such that MP-Auth_MA non-vacuously satisfies
message authentication from the human to the server.
Proof. We show that for all combinations of our exemplary
predicates, the protocol does not satisfy the message au-
thentication property or does not satisfy the corresponding
functionality property.
Let ‘Human’ be a rule-based human that behaves according
to a combination of the exemplary guidelines.
Consider the trace AT shown in Figure 10. The
trace is valid if the MP-Auth_MA protocol is executed
with the untrained human agent. The trace does not
satisfy the message authentication property stated in
Definition 4, because it contains a Commit action, but
no corresponding Send action. By Claims 14, 15, 17
and 19 below, AT satisfies all combinations of
predicates that do not include NoTell(‘Human’, ‘OK’)
and NoTellExcept(‘Human’, ‘OK’, E), for E ∈
{‘OK’,‘P’,‘S’,‘m’,‘idH’,‘idS’}. Therefore, for all these
combinations, the protocol does not satisfy the message
authentication property.
It remains to consider combinations of
predicates that include NoTell(‘Human’, ‘OK’)
or NoTellExcept(‘Human’, ‘OK’, E) for some
E ∈ {‘OK’,‘P’,‘S’,‘m’,‘idH’,‘idS’}. We show for each
of these predicates that the protocol violates the message
authentication functionality property.
By Definition 4, a necessary requirement for the MP-
Auth_MA protocol to non-vacuously satisfy the message au-
thentication property is that the server reaches the specified
Commit action. For simplicity, we call this the Functional
predicate:
Functional(S,H,m, tr) := ∃Commit(S,H,m) ∈ tr.
By Claims 16 and 18, NoTell(‘Human’, ‘OK’)
and NoTellExcept(‘Human’, ‘OK’, E) for all
E ∈ {‘OK’,‘P’,‘S’,‘m’,‘idH’,‘idS’} contradict the Functional
predicate. Thus the MP-Auth_MA protocol does not non-
vacuously satisfy the message authentication property for any
combination of our examplary predicates.
The following claims are used in the proof of the preceding
claim.
Claim 14. The attack trace AT satisfies the
predicate NoGet(‘Human’, x) and the predicate
ICompare(‘Human’, x) for any tag x.
Proof. As there are no Receive events of the human
‘Human’ in the attack trace, the predicates are satisfied for
any tag x.
Consequently, NoGet and ICompare do not avoid the at-
tack trace AT . Next, we consider NoTell and NoTellExcept.
Because there is a Send(‘Human’, sec, D, 〈‘OK’, OK〉) event
in AT , we distinguish between the case where the tag is equal
to ‘OK’ and the case where it is not. We start with the latter.
Claim 15. The attack trace AT satisfies the
predicate NoTell(‘Human’, x) and the predicate
NoTellExcept(‘Human’, x, E) for any tag E and for
any tag x that is not equal to ‘OK’.
Proof. As there are no Send events of the human ‘Human’ for
a tag x which is unequal to ‘OK’, the predicates are satisfied
for any E and any x unequal to ‘OK’.
AT =[{InitK(‘Human’, 〈‘OK’, OK〉),
InitK(‘Human’, 〈‘D’, D〉),





{Start(S, 〈skS, ‘Human’, idS, idH, rS, rD〉)}b,
{Start(D, 〈‘Human’, idH, pk(skS), idS, S, rS, rD〉)}b,
{Receive(S, ins, P,m)}b,
{Fresh(S, rS2)}b,
{Send(S, ins, P, senc(〈m, rS2〉, f(rS, rD)))}b,
{Receive(D, ins, P, senc(〈m, rS2〉, f(rS, rD)))}b,
{Send(D, sec, ‘Human’, 〈‘m’,m〉)}b,
{Send(‘Human’, sec, D, 〈‘OK’, OK〉)}b,
{Receive(D, sec, ‘Human’, 〈‘OK’, OK〉)}b,
{Send(D, ins, P, senc(f(m, rS2), f(rS, rD)))}b,
{Receive(S, ins, P, senc(f(m, rS2), f(rS, rD)))}b,
{Commit(S, ‘Human’,m)}b]
Fig. 10: A trace of MP-Auth_MA violating message authenti-
cation. Multisets are denoted by {}b.
We now consider the special case where the tag is equal to
‘OK’. We establish with Tamarin:
Claim 16. NoTell(‘Human’, ‘OK’) contradicts the
Functional predicate of the protocol.
For this reason, NoTell(‘Human’, ‘OK’) is not
applicable. It remains to show what happens with
NoTellExcept(‘Human’, ‘OK’, E). We first distinguish
the case where E corresponds to the tag that ‘Human’
associates with his device.
Claim 17. The attack trace AT is not excluded by the
predicate NoTellExcept(‘Human’, ‘OK’, ‘D’) where ‘D’ is the
tag that the human associates with his device in the initial
knowledge.
Proof. The attack trace AT satisfies the trace because the
human only sends ‘OK’ to the device on a secure channel.
Next, we analyze the case where E corresponds to any
other tag that appears in the initial knowledge of ‘Human’.
We establish with Tamarin:
Claim 18. NoTellExcept(‘Human’, ‘OK’, E) with the
tag E ∈ {‘OK’,‘P’,‘S’,‘m’,‘idH’,‘idS’}, contradicts the
Functional predicate of the protocol.
Finally, we consider the case where E corresponds to any
0. H : knows(D,P, S, pw, idH)
0. D : knows(H, kDS)
0. S : knows(H,D, pw, idH, kDS)
1. H •−→• P : S, idH
2. P ◦−→• S : idH
3. S •−→• P : fresh(r).senc(r, kDS)
4. P •−→• D : senc(r, kDS)
5. D •−→• H : otpw(r)
6. H •−→• P : pw, otpw(r)
7. P •−→• S : pw, otpw(r)
Fig. 11: Protocol Cronto
other tag that is not appearing in the initial knowledge of
‘Human’.
Claim 19. The attack trace AT is not excluded by the
predicate NoTellExcept(‘Human’, ‘OK’, E) with a tag E /∈
{‘OK’,‘D’,‘P’,‘S’,‘m’,‘idH’,‘idS’}.
Proof. The implication in the definition of NoTellExcept
is alway true if its third argument is not a tag that ap-
pears in the human’s initial knowledge. Therefore, for E /∈
{‘OK’,‘D’,‘P’,‘S’,‘m’,‘idH’,‘idS’}, all traces are allowed and
the attack trace AT is not excluded.
E. Case Study Protocols
We now provide more details on the protocols used in
Section VI. As already stated, in all the protocols a human
H wants to authenticate to a server S. For this purpose he
has access to a platform P and exclusive access to a personal
device D. Moreover, idH is always the human’s identity, pw
a password, and otpw a one-time password that is freshly
generated in each run. Recall, that when not stated otherwise,
we assume the channels between H and P as well as the
channels between H and D to be secure. Further, we model a
TLS connection between P and S by assuming that the first
message from P to S is sent on a confidential channel and
the subsequent messages on a secure channel.
A variation of the protocol Cronto can be used for transac-
tion authentication. We call this version Cronto_MA because
we examine if it satisfies the message authentication property.
In all the other protocols, depicted in Figures 13–16, m
denotes the message that we have explicitly added to examine
message authentication (see Section VI-B2). This means that
in the original versions of the protocols m is empty.
All the protocols except for Phoolproof start with the human
entering his identity and the name of the server he wants to
contact on the platform P . Afterward, P relays the identity of
H to the server S.
1) Cronto: In this protocol, shown in Figure 11, the server
shares a secret key kDS with the device. After having received
the human’s identity, the server S generates a fresh nonce
r and encrypts it with kDS in the form of a cryptogram. S
then sends the cryptogram to P where it is displayed for the
human. The human uses the device D to scan the cryptogram.
We assume that the scanning of the graphic is done over a
0. H : knows(D,P, S,m, idH)
0. D : knows(H, kDS)
0. S : knows(H,D, idH, kDS)
1. H •−→• P : idH, S,m
2. P ◦−→• S : idH,m
3. S •−→• P : fresh(r).senc(〈r,m〉, kDS)
4. P •−→• D : senc(〈r,m〉, kDS)
5. D •−→• H : m, otpw(r,m)
6. H •−→• P : otpw(r,m)
7. P •−→• S : otpw(r,m)
Fig. 12: Protocol Cronto_MA
0. H : knows(P,D, S, pw,m, idH)
0. D : knows(H)
0. S : knows(H, pw,D, idH)
1. H •−→• P : S, idH, pw,m
2. P ◦−→• S : idH,m
3. S ◦−→• D : fresh(c).c,m
4. D •−→• H : c,m
5. H •−→• P : S, c
6. P •−→• S : c, pw,m
Fig. 13: Protocol Google 2-Step
secure channel from P to D. D decrypts the cryptogram with
the known key and computes a one-time password from the
retrieved r that it displays to the human. H then enters the
one-time password together with his password on P , which
relays it to S.
Cronto_MA, depicted in Figure 12, denotes the version of
the protocol that can be used for transaction authentication.
The human H first enters his identity idH , the server S
he wants to contact, and a message m on the platform P .
Afterward, P relays idH and m to the server S and S
computes a fresh nonce r. In contrast to Cronto for entity
authentication, Figure 11, S computes the cryptogram over
both the nonce r and the message m. The result is again sent
to P and scanned with the device D, which decrypts it. The
one-time password that D computes next also contains the
nonce r and the message m that H sent. D displays the one-
time password together with m to H . H checks if it is the
right m and if it is he enters otpw on P which relays it to S.
2) Google 2-Step: Figure 13 depicts Google’s two-factor
authentication. Upon being contacted by the platform P of
the human H , the server S generates a fresh code c. The code
is then sent to the device D, for example by SMS, i.e., by text
message. We assume a confidential SMS channel. In the final
steps, the human reads the code from the device, enters it on
P , and P sends the code and the password to the server.
3) OTP over SMS: Figure 14 models the protocol OTP
over SMS in which the server S sends a one-time password to
the human’s device D. Bonneau et al. [8] do not describe a
specific protocol that they have in mind but rather say that one-
time passwords can be used in different ways. Among others,
it is pointed out that they can be used as a second factor.
0. H : knows(D,P, S,m, idH)
0. D : knows(H)
0. S : knows(H,D, idH)
1. H •−→• P : S, idH,m
2. P ◦−→• S : idH,m
3. S ◦−→• D : fresh(otpw).otpw,m
4. D •−→• H : otpw,m
5. H •−→• P : otpw
6. P •−→• S : m, otpw
Fig. 14: Protocol OTP over SMS
0. H : knows(D,P, S, pw,m, idH)
0. D : knows(H,S, skD, idH,pk(skS))
0. S : knows(H,D, idH, pw, skS, pk(skD))
1. H •−→• D : S,m
2. D •−→• P : S
3. P ◦−→◦ S : ‘hello’
4. S ◦−→◦ P : fresh(chall).chall, sign(chall, skS)
5. P •−→• D : chall, sign(chall, skS)
6. D •−→• P : idH,m, sign(〈idH, chall,m〉, skD)
7. P ◦−→• S : idH,m, sign(〈idH, chall,m〉, skD)
8. H •−→• P : pw, idH
9. P ◦−→• S : idH,m, pw
Fig. 15: Protocol Phoolproof
If we use a one-time password as a second factor, together
with a normal password, the protocol closely resembles the
Google 2-Step protocol. For this reason, we chose to model a
protocol that uses a one-time password as a single factor. We
model the one-time password by a random nonce otpw that
the server S freshly generates in each protocol run. otpw is
sent to the device D over an SMS channel, which we assume
to be confidential. otpw is then displayed on the device for
the human. Finally, the human enters otpw on the platform,
from where it is sent to the server.
4) Phoolproof: Figure 15 depicts Phoolproof, the only
protocol we examine that does not start with the human telling
his platform to which server he wants to connect. Instead, the
human selects on his device D the server S from a list of
registered servers. The device then communicates this choice
to the platform P , over a Bluetooth channel, which we assume
to be secure. Next, the platform P sends a ‘hello’ message
to the sever S. We assume that the communication between
P and S is first insecure and then, from Step 7 onwards,
confidential from P to S, which models the start of the TLS
connection. Upon receiving the initialization message from P ,
S sends a signed challenge chall over P to D. D then signs
the identity of the human idH and the challenge chall and
sends idH , together with the signature, back to S, again via
P . Finally, the human enters his password and idH on P and
P relays it to the server.
5) Sound-Proof: Recall that the idea of Sound-Proof, shown
in Figure 16, is to authenticate a human H who logs into
platform P by measuring if his device D is in the proximity
0. H : knows(pw, P,D, S, idH)
0. D : knows(H,S, skD,OK)
0. S : knows(H,D, pk(skD), pw, idH)
1. H •−→• P : S, idH, pw
2. P ◦−→• S : idH, pw
3. S •−→• P : ‘record’,pk(skD)
4. S •−→• D : ‘record’
5. P, D : fresh(r)
6. P •−→• S : fresh(k).senc(〈S, r〉, k),
aenc(k,pk(skD))
7. S •−→• D : senc(〈S, r〉, k), aenc(k, pk(skD))
8. D •−→• S : OK
Fig. 16: Protocol Sound-Proof
of P . The measurement of whether D and P are at the same
location is done by measuring ambient noise. In a setup phase
prior to protocol execution, the human H registers his device.
For this reason, S knows which device D belongs to H and
also knows D’s public key. In the setup phase, the application
on D is also bound to the user’s account on the server S. We
therefore assume that D and S know each other and model the
TLS connection between S and D with secure channels. After
the server S receives from P the identity and the password
from the user, S sends a ‘record’-command to both the device
and the platform. S also sends the public key of D to P . It is
assumed that no one can be in the same location as P and D.
We therefore model the ambient noise by a fresh nonce that is
only given to the platform and the device. P then encrypts the
measured information r and S with a fresh symmetric key k.
Further, P encrypts k with the public key of D. The encrypted
messages are sent, over the server S, to D. Finally, D decrypts
the measurement r and compares it to the measurement it
previously made. In the actual protocol, D accepts and sends
an OK message to the server if the measurements are roughly
the same. In our model, we require that D receives the same
nonce that it previously stored. An advantage of the protocol
is that it reduces the overhead for the human of having to
interact with the device.
